Perceptions of Institutional Quality: Evidence of Limited Attention to Higher Education Rankings by Meyer, Andrew G. et al.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications Economics, Department of
10-1-2017
Perceptions of Institutional Quality: Evidence of







Accepted version. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 142 (October 2017): 241-258.





Economics Faculty Research and Publications/College of Business 
Administration 
 
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; but the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The 
published version may be accessed by following the link in the citation below. 
 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 142, October (2017): 241-258. DOI. This article is © 
Elsevier and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. 
Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Elsevier. 
Perceptions of institutional quality: Evidence of limited 
attention to higher education rankings 
 
Andrew G. Meyer 
Department of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI  
Andrew R. Hanson 
Department of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI  
Daniel C. Hickman 
College of Business and Economics, University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 
 
Abstract 
Rankings of colleges and universities provide information about quality and potentially affect where 
prospective students send applications for admission. We find evidence of limited attention to the 
popular U.S. News and World Report rankings of America’s Best Colleges. We estimate that 
applications discontinuously drop by 2%–6% when the rank moves from inside the top 50 to outside 
the top 50 whereas there is no evidence of a corresponding discontinuous drop in institutional quality. 
Notably, the ranking of 50 corresponds to the first page cutoff of the printed U.S. News guides. The 
choice of college is typically a one-time decision with potentially large repercussions, so students’ 
limited attention to rankings likely represents an irrational bias that negatively affects welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In contrast to standard economic models of rational decision makers in which individuals incorporate 
all information, economists and psychologists have uncovered multiple settings where individuals rely 
upon limited information to simplify complex decisions (DellaVigna, 2009). The bulk of this evidence 
originates from laboratory experiments, but there is growing empirical evidence that economic agents 
use these decision heuristics in uncontrived settings as well (for example, Busse et al., 2013, Chetty et 
al., 2009, Conlin et al., 2007, Finkelstein, 2009, Lacetera et al., 2012, Pope, 2009). Understanding how, 
why, and when decision makers deviate from standard economic models is important for a more 
complete understanding of behavior and for improving predictive ability of theoretical models. 
 
We investigate how limited attention affects decision making in the context of applying for admission 
to institutions of higher education (IHEs); in particular, we examine how salient thresholds of IHE 
rankings (top 10, top 50, or top 100) affect student applications.1 The college application decision is of 
primary importance as it is typically only made once and has lifelong implications.2 To understand the 
effect of ranking salience on application behavior, we form a panel of IHEs by merging institutional 
information from the U.S. Department of Education IPEDS database with U.S. News and World Report 
(USNWR) rankings of national Liberal Arts Colleges and National Universities. We use the panel to test 
for discontinuous changes in applications at thresholds that may be most salient to students. 
 
The ranking threshold of 50 may be particularly salient because it represents the last numerical ranking 
on the first page of IHE rankings in the printed version of the USNWR. We find evidence to support this 
theory; there is a robust discontinuity in the number of applications received by IHEs at the ranking 
threshold of 50. Specifically, we find that applications discontinuously drop by 2%–6% when an IHE 
crosses over this threshold. Additionally, we present evidence that the discontinuity at the threshold of 
50 is stronger in the earlier years of our sample relative to later years. Patterns in survey and Google 
search data imply a concurrent decrease in the relative importance of the printed USNWR guide in the 
later years of our sample, further supporting our claim that the physical page break matters. We also 
find weaker evidence of a similar discontinuity occurring at the threshold of 100. These discontinuities 
in applications support a theory of limited attention to rankings and indicate that prospective students 
may form quality perceptions of IHEs using heuristic information processing. Our calculations suggest 
that potentially thousands of students have ultimately enrolled at IHEs with inferior rankings because 
of limited attention over our 10-year sample period. 
 
We initially follow the Lacetera et al. (2012) approach to estimate discontinuities at multiple 
thresholds. We then utilize a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the treatment effect of 
crossing the ranking threshold of 50. Specifically, we estimate nonparametric local linear regressions, 
which narrow the bandwidth to include only observations that are closer to the top-50 threshold. 
Results from these local linear regressions also show a discontinuous drop in applications when 
crossing the threshold of 50 that is robust to the RD inference suggested by Calonico et al., 2014a, 
Calonico et al., 2014b and Calonico et al., 2016a, Calonico et al., 2016b, Calonico et al., 2016c. 
Moreover, falsification tests do not show discontinuities at other rankings thresholds that should not 
matter for limited attention. 
 
Our identification strategy addresses potential omitted variable bias that occurs because rank is 
correlated with quality, whereas previous studies may attribute IHE outcomes to the rank when IHE 
quality may be driving both IHE rank and IHE outcomes.3 Moreover, we are able to test for a 
discontinuous drop in IHE quality when crossing the threshold of 50. Alongside the more visible ordinal 
ranking—which determines treatment status—the USNWR provides a cardinal measure of IHE quality. 
We do not find any discontinuous drop in this cardinal overall score in crossing the USNWR threshold 
of 50. This further supports our claim that students are overreacting to the visibility of the top-50 in 
their application decisions. 
 
Perhaps the most closely related study, Bowman and Bastedo (2009) find that moving onto the front 
page of the USNWR guide improves admissions outcomes including acceptance rate, incoming student 
quality, and number of applications for IHEs. However, their study period runs from 1997 to 2004. 
During this time period, USNWR only provided numerical rankings for the top 50 IHEs within a 
category. As such, their sample includes only the 56 National Universities and 56 national Liberal Arts 
Colleges that make it to the top-50 during this time. Furthermore, with no continuous ranking or 
measure of quality for IHEs outside of the top 50, it is difficult to separate the causal effect of rankings 
from the effects of unobserved quality differences. 
 
Several recent studies have provided evidence on the causality of rankings or ratings on various 
outcomes. Pope (2009) identifies the causal effect of rankings on hospital admissions by exploiting 
plausibly exogenous changes in USNWR methodology. Luca and Smith (2013) likewise leverage changes 
in the USNWR methodology to estimate the causal impact of rankings on student application decisions. 
The authors show that an exogenous one-rank improvement in USNWR rankings leads to an 
approximate 1%-2% increase in applications. Anderson and Magruder (2012) utilize a regression 
discontinuity design to identify the effect of a more positive restaurant rating on availability and find a 
significant causal effect of receiving an extra one-half star from Yelp.com on availability of reservations 
at San Francisco restaurants. 
 
Another group of studies provide evidence of behavioral biases in student behavior.4Luca and Smith 
(2013) find that prospective students fail to use all available information because the salience of the 
USNWR rankings matters. Specifically, rankings have no effect on application decisions when rankings 
are presented in an alphabetically organized list. Luca and Smith (2015) provide evidence that IHEs 
recognize students may respond differently to information based on visibility. Among other findings, 
they show that business school websites often shroud information about their rankings and coarsen 
rankings information to state only a category of rankings such as “top 20.” 
 
As noted by DellaVigna (2009) and Lacetera et al. (2012), it is not clear if limited attention is a rational 
calculation under informational processing constraints or an irrational bias. Our results show that 
limited attention persists in the context of the college application decision. It is typically relatively low 
cost to apply to the marginal school on one’s list. However, repercussions from omitting an application 
because of inattention could be large in terms of financial aid or eventual labor market outcomes. This 
suggests that, even if limited attention is boundedly rational, prospective students may not be 
allocating their limited attention in an optimal manner. 
 
2. Background and data 
 
Each September, the USNWR releases its annual rankings guide titled America’s Best Colleges. These 
guides rank IHEs within the categories of “National Universities,” “National Liberal Arts Colleges,” 
“Regional Universities,” and “Regional Colleges.” Depending on the year, the guides also provide 
rankings according to specialty categories such as “Best Value Schools” or specific program such as 
“Finance.” The most prominent and publicized categories are “National Universities” and “National 
Liberal Arts Colleges.” Our study includes all ranked IHEs from these two categories over the years 
2004–2013. Table 1 summarizes the rankings by category and year for our sample period. Depending 
on the year, the guides rank between 120 and 199 National Universities and between 104 and 187 
national Liberal Arts Colleges. Remaining IHEs in these categories are listed alphabetically without a 
rank and are hence not part of our sample. Prior to 2004, the USNWR guides only ranked the top 50 
IHEs so we do not include any observations from 2003 or earlier. 
 
Table 1. US News Rankings Summary. 
 National Universities Liberal Arts Colleges 




Last Rank on 1st 
Page 




Last Rank on 1st 
Page 
1st Rank on 2nd 
Page 
2004 123 48 51 106 50 52 
2005 120 50 52 105 50 51 
2006 120 50 52 104 49 51 
2007 124 47 52 104 48 51 
2008 124 50 52 122 49 52 
2009 130 50 51 122 49 53 
2010 128 50 52 122 49 53 
2011 191 50 51 187 47 51 
2012 194 50 53 178 49 51 
2013 199 46 51 178 49 52 
 
There is previous evidence that a substantial portion of students consider these rankings when 
deciding where to apply and/or enroll.5 The USNWR rankings are the most widely circulated IHE 
rankings in the United States (Gnolek et al., 2014; Griffith and Rask, 2004) so prospective students are 
more likely to see these rankings relative to others. Pryor et al. (2009) report that 18.5% of first-time, 
full-time, first-year students say “rankings in national magazines” are “very important” in their decision 
of which particular college to attend. Yet there is reason to suspect that students may not process the 
rankings information perfectly. Higher education is a costly service where prospective students must 
simultaneously consider many complex attributes. For example, Pryor et al. (2009) reports 16 factors 
that at least 5% of first-time, full-time, first-year students choose as “very important” in deciding to 
attend a particular college. Psychologists and behavioral economists have theorized that individuals 
process only a subset of information to simplify complex decisions (DellaVigna, 2009) so students may 
focus on only the most salient features of rankings information. Furthermore, a growing body of 
research suggests that prospective college students may be particularly susceptible to behavioral 
biases in the context of the college application and attendance decision.6DellaVigna (2009) proposes a 
simple model of limited attention to motivate strategies to test for inattention; one such strategy is to 
test whether consumer behavior changes based upon the salience of an opaque component of a 
good’s value. Thus, in our context, we are theorizing that crossing over certain rankings thresholds is 
more salient to prospective students than marginal changes in rankings that do not cross such 
thresholds. 
 
As previously mentioned, a crucial aspect of the print editions of America’s Best Colleges is that there is 
always a page break separating IHEs that are ranked in the top 50 from IHEs ranked at 51 or worse. 
Table 1 shows the last rank appearing on the first page of the rankings and the first rank appearing on 
the second page of rankings. Specific numerical ranking values are sometimes missing because of ties. 
IHEs ranked at 50 or better are more visible in the printed guide relative to those ranked 51 or worse 
because of this page break. The threshold of 50 is likely the most important because of the structure of 
the guides, but other thresholds may matter also. IHEs sometimes identify themselves as a “top 10” or 
“top 100” institution.7 For example, Luca and Smith (2015) document some evidence of this kind of 
shrouding behavior among business schools. These thresholds may also be important simply because 
of informational processing heuristics if cutoffs of 10 or 100 are more salient than other rankings. 
 
USNWR collects data on many dimensions, assigns a weight to each measure, and produces a 
composite weighted quality score.8 The composite score takes on a value between 0 and 100 and is 
displayed only according to an integer value. This integer score which carries some cardinal 
information about quality differences is then used to create an ordinal rank for the IHEs. The ordinal 
rank is the most visible information because it is bolded or highlighted in color and because IHEs are 
listed in table form according to this ordinal rank. Because the rankings preserve an ordinal measure of 
quality, we would expect IHEs with better rankings to receive more interest from students and hence 
more applications. However, a discontinuous drop in applications without a discontinuous drop in IHE 
quality at a rankings threshold provides evidence of limited attention. 
 
We merge two data sources for our analysis, the U.S. IPEDS database and the print editions of 
America’s Best Colleges (U.S. News & World Report, 2004–2013). The outcome variable utilized in our 
analysis, the number of applications an IHE receives, is collected from the IPEDS database that contains 
a large quantity of information for each institution. Each IHE directly reports this information via 
annual surveys conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Any IHE that 
participates in any federal financial assistance program is required to complete these surveys. The 
variable we focus on is the number of first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students 
who applied for admission to an institution for the fall period. This information is collected for the fall 
periods of 2003–2013.9 Additionally, we use IPEDS to record the sector and Carnegie classification10 for 
each IHE, and to collect data on the number of applicants that were admitted and the number enrolled 
for each fall period. We match the USNWR rankings that are released in September of a given year to 
the applications received in the following fall period. For example, the 2005 edition of America’s Best 
Colleges was released in September 2004; these rankings are matched to applications received for fall 
2005. 
 
Merging IPEDS data with the USNWR rankings produces a sample size of 2696 IHE-year observations. 
We further restrict our sample to IHEs that report applications to IPEDS in the prior year because we 
condition on this lagged variable in our empirical strategy; this restricts the sample to 2613 IHE-year 
observations. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics on applications, first-year enrollment, and the 
admit rate for several groupings of USNWR rankings. Panel A shows that average applications fall as 
the USNWR ranking worsens for both National Universities and for Liberal Arts Colleges. However, the 
decline in applications is more pronounced for Liberal Arts Colleges. For example, there are 
approximately 44% fewer average applications for Liberal Arts Colleges ranked 51–100 relative to 
applications for Liberal Arts Colleges ranked in the top 50. The analogous decline for National 
Universities is approximately 20%. Panel B shows that there is less variability in full-time first-year 
enrollment across the various groupings of rankings. Average first-year enrollment for Liberal Arts 
Colleges ranked 51–100 is approximately 18% lower than the average for Liberal Arts Colleges ranked 
in the top 50. Moreover, average enrollment is actually higher for National Universities ranked 51–100 
relative to those ranked in the top 50. The admit rate, shown in Panel C, largely explains the 
discrepancies between applications and enrollment. Better ranked IHEs are more selective in which 
students they admit. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics by Rank. 
 National Universities Liberal Arts Colleges 
Rank Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Applications 
Top 10 21,601.5 21,762 7,870.2 5,446.5 5,321.5 1416 
Top 50 23,516.4 21,336 12,458.4 4,963.7 4,829.5 1,767.1 
51–100 18,840.8 18,939 9,699.1 2,792.9 2,455.5 1543.9 
>100 12,021.9 11,207 7,861.6 2,614.4 2232 1740.6 
Panel B: Full-time First-year Enrollment 
Top 10 1,451.2 1391 500.1 470.4 482.5 101.2 
Top 50 2,600.4 1659 1,842.3 526.1 504 155.2 
51–100 3,505.2 3458 2,013.8 432.3 417.5 166.4 
>100 2,600.2 2498 1,606.3 392.4 373 182.2 
Panel C: Admit Rate 
Top 10 12.37 10.94 4.86 22.64 21.60 6.42 
Top 50 32.15 29.44 17.59 35.75 34.21 13.12 
 National Universities Liberal Arts Colleges 
Rank Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
51–100 61.56 61.99 14.79 64.33 65.38 14.42 
>100 70.39 72.04 13.38 68.24 68.99 12.81 
 
Fig. 1 plots applications against the USNWR ranking for National Universities and Fig. 2 provides the 
same plot for national Liberal Arts Colleges. In each case, we create bins with a width of 2 and plot the 
average number of applications within each bin. For example, we average all of the observations on 
applications for IHEs ranked at 1 or 2 and plot this as one point. In both figures, there is an inverse 
relationship between ranking and average applications. This is what we would expect if ranking is a 
proxy for quality; applications fall as quality decreases. Vertical lines designate the first rank for which 
an IHE has crossed over an important threshold (10, 50, and 100). Visually, there appears to be a 
discontinuity at crossing the threshold of 50 in both figures, although it is starkest in Fig. 2. There is not 
a clear indication of a discontinuity when crossing over 10 in either figure, but Fig. 1 (National 




Fig. 1. Applications vs. Rank for National Universities. 
Notes: This figure shows average applications by USNWR Ranking for all IHEs in the National University 
classification. The bin width equals 2. Vertical lines indicate the first ranking for which a threshold has been 




Fig. 2. Applications vs. Rank for National Liberal Arts Colleges. 
Notes: This figure shows average applications by USNWR Ranking for all IHEs in the national Liberal Arts College 
classification. The bin width equals 2. Vertical lines indicate the first ranking for which a threshold has been 
crossed (11, 51, 101). 
 
3. Empirical strategy and results 
3.1. Parametric regressions 
We begin with a regression analysis based on Lacetera et al. (2012). This method is similar to a 
regression discontinuity design because it flexibly controls for smooth changes in applications as an IHE 
falls in the rankings and estimates discontinuous changes in applications at certain thresholds. We test 
for discontinuities in the natural log of applications (lnapp) at the potentially important rankings 
thresholds of 10, 50, and 100 in the following regression specification: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑓(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽10𝐼[𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 > 10] + 𝛽50𝐼[𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 > 50] + 𝛽100𝐼[𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 > 100] +
𝛾𝑋it + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,         
            (1) 
 
where I(.) is the indicator function and Xit is a vector of baseline controls. We parametrically control for 
the smooth relationship between rank and applications with 𝑓(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡). As a baseline, we utilize a 
quartic polynomial but also present results for higher and lower order polynomials. We primarily focus 
on results that pool IHEs ranked as National Universities with those ranked under Liberal Arts but we 
present separate results for both ranking categories for completeness. Following previous research, we 
take the natural log of applications to normalize application size differences across IHEs and for ease of 
interpreting results. We cluster standard errors at the IHE level for all parametric specifications to 
account for potential serial correlation. 
 
It is likely that our panel context has IHE-specific time-invariant unobservables that would motivate the 
use of a fixed effects regression in a traditional setting. However, as noted by Lee and Lemieux (2010), 
including fixed effects is unnecessary for identification in the RD design. Similarly, year fixed effects can 
be included as a baseline covariate but are not necessary for identification. Furthermore, including IHE 
fixed effects could actually increase the variance of the RD estimator when there is little within-IHE 
variation in the treatment status (Lee and Lemiux, 2010). This is precisely the case in the USNWR 
rankings. For example, few IHE’s move in or out of the top 10 from year to year; but, applications are 
highly persistent from year to year within an IHE, so including lagged applications can help reduce 
sampling error (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Therefore, we borrow this intuition from the RD literature and 
include a lag of logged applications as a baseline control. Our natural experiment can thus be 
conceptualized as, “Conditional on the previous year’s applications, is there a discontinuous change in 
applications when crossing over a salient rankings threshold?” 
 
Table 3 shows regression results for the pooled sample including National Universities and Liberal Arts 
institutions using quartic polynomial controls. Column 1 only controls for the lag of logged applications, 
a quartic polynomial of IHE rank, and the ranking thresholds of 10, 50, and 100. Column 2 adds 
indicator variables for year, Carnegie classification (Bachelors only vs. offering graduate degrees), and 
sector (private vs. public IHE). Therefore, we are identifying the discontinuities in column 2 by 
comparing applications at IHEs of different rankings but in the same Carnegie classification, sector, and 
year. In columns 3 and 4, we add additional time-varying controls for IHE quality. We lag these 
variables by one year to reflect the quality of the IHE at the time that students are making their 
application decisions. Column 3 adds only real instructional expenditures per student and real total 
expenditures per student whereas column 4 also adds the average of the 75th percentile of an IHE’s 
verbal and math SAT scores.11 Finally, column 5 estimates the model including IHE fixed effects. This 
restricts us to utilizing variation in rankings within the IHE to identify the model.12 
 
Table 3. Regression Results: Effects of Rankings Thresholds on Logged Applications. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Threshold 
>10 0.00949 0.00389 0.00122 0.00778 −0.0238 
 (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0393) 
>50 −0.0196* −0.0223** −0.0221** −0.0190* −0.0430** 
 (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0218) 
>100 −0.0221* −0.0220* −0.0208 −0.0204 −0.0240 
 (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0140) (0.0176) 
Indicators for Carnegie, Sector, Year No Yes Yes Yes No 
IHE Fixed Effects No No No No Yes 
Additional Time-Varying Controls None None Exp./Student Exp./Student, SAT None 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Observations 2613 2613 2585 2371 2613 
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.991 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Regression specifications for all columns include the one-year lag of logged applications and quartic polynomials 
of USNWR rank. Exp./Student indicates controls for 1-year lags of instructional and total expenditures per 
student. SAT indicates controls for the 1-year lag of the average of the 75th percentile of verbal and math SAT 
scores. 
 
As seen in Table 3, the most robust discontinuity occurs at the threshold of 50. We find an approximate 
2% drop in applications when an IHE crosses the threshold of 50. We also see some evidence of a 
similar discontinuous drop in applications as an IHE crosses the threshold of 100 in the rankings where 
the estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level in columns 1 and 2. We do not see any 
evidence of discontinuities in applications at the thresholds of 10.13Table 4 separates our sample into 
the two USNWR categories of National Universities and Liberal Arts colleges. The magnitude of the 
drop at the threshold of 50 is slightly larger for Liberal Arts Colleges as compared to National 
Universities in terms of point estimates. However, the effect is less precisely estimated for Liberal Arts 
IHEs. 
 
Table 4. Regression Results by USNWR Category: Effects of Rankings Thresholds on Logged 
Applications. 
 National Universities Liberal Arts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Threshold 
>10 0.00358 0.00369 0.0143 0.0266 
 (0.0172) (0.0183) (0.0150) (0.0166) 
>50 −0.0195* −0.0190* −0.0339* −0.0322 
 (0.00998) (0.0103) (0.0189) (0.0210) 
>100 −0.0245 −0.0257 −0.0123 −0.00287 
 (0.0153) (0.0162) (0.0213) (0.0236) 
Additional Time-Varying Controls No Exp./Student, SAT No Exp./Student, SAT 
Observations 1368 1294 1245 1077 
R-squared 0.981 0.980 0.960 0.961 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. 
Regression specifications for all columns include the one-year lag of logged applications, quartic polynomials of 
USNWR rank, and indicators for Carnegie classification, IHE sector, and year. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Exp./Student indicates controls for 1-year lags of instructional and total expenditures per student. 
SAT indicates controls for the 1-year lag of the average of the 75th percentile of verbal and math SAT scores. 
One concern is that our results could be driven by the specific polynomial controls that we have chosen 
to capture the smooth relationship between ranking and applications. Therefore, we present results 
for the pooled sample in Appendix Table A1 using polynomials of order 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7. As seen in 
Table A1, the discontinuity in crossing the ranking threshold of 50 is robust to the choice of polynomial. 
Also, we consistently see negative point estimates when crossing the threshold of 100 but most of the 
estimates are statistically insignificant. To provide more insight into the magnitudes of the effects, we 
present results using the level of applications in place of logged applications in Table 5. On average, 
IHEs lose several hundred applications when falling out of the top 50. Coefficients on the indicators for 
the ranking threshold of 100 are consistently negative across the specifications in Table 5, but typically 
are not precisely estimated. 
 
Table 5. Regression Results: Effects of Rankings Thresholds on Level of Applications. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Threshold 
>10 −207.1 −81.13 58.47 69.49 32.56 −16.96 
 (127.5) (156.0) (170.2) (196.1) (206.6) (199.4) 
>50 −198.6* −190.2* −264.4** −270.6** −266.7* −386.9** 
 (112.7) (111.8) (118.4) (137.4) (137.3) (153.7) 
>100 −106.2 −200.3* −174.6 −169.0 −155.8 −39.42 
 (87.00) (106.4) (107.1) (116.0) (116.4) (127.9) 
Polynomial Order 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Observations 2613 2613 2613 2613 2613 2613 
R-squared 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Regression specifications for all columns include the 1-year lag of applications, indicators for Carnegie 
classification, IHE sector, and year. 
 
Our results indicate that the rankings threshold of 50 is the most important cutoff in determining 
applications. Crossing over 50 is the only ranking where we see robust evidence of a significant 
discontinuity; there is little to no evidence of a discontinuity when dropping out of the top 10 and only 
weak evidence that dropping out of the top 100 discontinuously affects applications. One plausible 
explanation is that the thresholds of 10 and 100 are not as salient to students because these do not 
correspond to page breaks in the printed USNWR guides. Another potential factor is that there is not 
much variation in IHEs that cross over the threshold of 10. For the years 2005–2013 there are only 2 (6) 
instances where a National University (Liberal Arts IHE) moves into the top 10. Similarly, there are only 
3 (5) occasions where a National University (Liberal Arts IHE) falls out of the top 10. 
 
Thus far, we have included all observations in our analysis to identify potential discontinuities. The 
benefit of this approach is that we can simultaneously estimate effects at multiple thresholds. 
However, the downside is that we are identifying effects in part using data far from the thresholds of 
interest. For example, it may be undesirable to identify a discontinuity at the threshold of 50 with 
observations from IHEs ranked in the top 10 or worse than 100. Therefore, rather than fitting all the 
data with a parametric function, we next focus on the most important threshold of 50 and conduct a 
more data-driven analysis. 
 
3.2. Nonparametric local linear RD 
In our application, the running variable of USNWR ranking determines assignment to the limited 
visibility treatment. IHEs ranked at 50 or better always appear on the first page of the printed USNWR 
guide whereas IHEs ranked at 51 or worse always appear on the second or third page of the guide. We 
first present some graphical evidence of a discontinuity in applications at this threshold. Fig. 3 shows a 
RD plot for applications to National Universities and Fig. 4 shows the analogous plot for Liberal Arts 
Colleges. Both of these figures plot the raw applications data and fit quadratic polynomials to both 
sides of the 50-threshold. There are sizable discontinuities in both figures with the drop in applications 
especially noticeable for Liberal Arts Colleges in Fig. 4. For National Universities, there is a graphical 
discontinuity of approximately 4000 applications when crossing the 50-threshold. Relative to average 
applications of approximately 24,000 for National Universities ranked between 40 and 60, this 
represents an approximate 17% discontinuous drop. The analogous graphical drop for Liberal Arts 
Colleges is approximately 1300 applications. This represents an approximate 34% discontinuous drop 
at the threshold of 50 relative to average applications for Liberal Arts Colleges ranked between 40 and 
60. However, the graphical evidence from the raw data likely overstates the magnitude of the 
discontinuity because applications and rankings tend to be persistent over time. We therefore 





Fig. 3. RD Plot for National Universities. 
Notes: This figure shows average applications by USNWR Ranking for all IHEs in the National University 
classification. The vertical line indicates the RD cutoff. Global quadratic functions are fit on both sides of the RD 




Fig. 4. RD Plot for Liberal Arts Colleges. 
Notes: This figure shows average applications by USNWR Ranking for all IHEs in the National University 
classification. The vertical line indicates the RD cutoff. Global quadratic functions are fit on both sides of the RD 
cutoff. The graph is produced using rdplot within the rdrobust package in Stata (Calonico et al., 2016c). 
 
For our RD analysis, we normalize the USNWR rank by the threshold value with 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑛?̃?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 51           (2) 
 
This results in the basic RD specification 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑓(𝑟𝑎𝑛?̃?𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 > 50) + 𝛾𝑋it + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,      (3) 
 
where f(.) controls for the underlying relationship between USNWR ranking and applications,14I(.) is the 
indicator function, and Xit includes a vector of predetermined IHE covariates. As in the parametric 
analysis of Section 3.1, we include a lag of the dependent variable in Xit to reduce the variance of our 
estimates. β is the parameter of interest, representing the limited attention treatment effect. 
 
RD estimators are often constructed with local polynomial non-parametric regression, where the local 
linear RD estimator is “perhaps the preferred and most common choice in practice” (Calonico et al., 
2014b).15 The benefit of narrowing the bandwidth for the RD is that we are less concerned about the 
adequacy of the polynomial controls but this comes at a cost of losing some information. One criterion 
for the choice of the bandwidth for this local estimator is to find the bandwidth that minimizes MSE of 
the local linear RD estimator16 (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). Calonico et al. (2014a) build on 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) to construct another MSE-optimal bandwidth selector and Calonico 
et al. (2016b) extends this to allow covariates. We present results utilizing the Calonico et al. (2016b) 
MSE optimal bandwidth selector as well the coverage error rate (CER) optimal bandwidth selector 
developed in Calonico et al., 2016a, Calonico et al., 2016b. 
 
Conventional RD point estimation in practice often ignores bias by either assuming that it is small or by 
shrinking the bandwidth enough so that the bias should disappear (Calonico et al., 2014a, Calonico et 
al., 2014b). However, a second approach is to construct an estimate of the bias and subtract that from 
the point estimate of the treatment effect. The key insight of Calonico et al. (2014a) is that inference 
should also account for the bias term in the estimated effects rather than rely on large-sample 
approximations. Therefore, we utilize a local linear RD point estimator with inference from robust 
nonparametric bias-correction methods (Calonico et al., 2014a, Calonico et al., 2014b, Calonico et al., 
2016a, Calonico et al., 2016b, Calonico et al., 2016c).17 We use the lag of logged applications, year fixed 
effects, a dummy for private versus public IHE, and a dummy for Carnegie classification of a bachelors 
institution as baseline covariates to improve precision. We report results using both the robust nearest 
neighbor variance estimation of Calonico et al., 2014a, Calonico et al., 2014b and the cluster robust 
nearest neighbor variance estimator as implemented in Calonico et al., 2016b, Calonico et al., 2016c.18 
As is standard in the RD literature, we primarily utilize a triangular kernel, which weights observations 
closer to the RD cutoff more heavily. We also present results using a uniform kernel to display the 
robustness of the results. 
 
Table 6 shows the local linear RD results at the threshold of 50. For completeness, we show 
conventional, bias-corrected (with conventional inference), and robust estimates of the RD treatment 
effect. The first four columns use a MSE-optimal bandwidth selector and last two columns use a CER-
optimal bandwidth selector. These two bandwidth selectors are suggested by Calonico et al., 2016a, 
Calonico et al., 2016b, Calonico et al., 2016c. Specifications in columns 3 and 4 add additional time-
varying controls for IHE quality; all others in Table 6 use only the aforementioned baseline covariates. 
Focusing on the bias-corrected point estimates, we see that crossing the ranking threshold of 50 results 
in an approximate 4.5%–6% drop in applications. Moreover, the results are statistically significant 
across all specifications in Table 6 and persist when using robust variance estimators in place of 
conventional inference procedures. 
 
Table 6. Local Linear RD Results at Ranking Threshold of 50 with Optimal Bandwidths. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional −0.0434** −0.0458** −0.0459** −0.0409** −0.0567* −0.0560** 
 (0.0218) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0293) (0.0237) 
Bias-Corrected −0.0492** −0.0512*** −0.0515*** −0.0458** −0.0595** −0.0592** 
 (0.0218) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0293) (0.0237) 
Bias-Corrected Robust −0.0492* −0.0512** −0.0515** −0.0458* −0.0595* −0.0592** 
 (0.0260) (0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0238) (0.0314) (0.0258) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BW Selection MSE MSE MSE MSE CER CER 
Order Local Poly 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Order Bias 2 2 2 2 2 2 
BW Local Poly 17.20 15.91 15.76 15.63 11.61 11.76 
BW Bias 29.19 27.74 27.59 26.99 29.19 27.74 





NN cluster NN cluster NN 
NN 
cluster 
Effective Observations 664 570 558 503 441 441 





Notes: Triangular kernel used in all columns. 
Standard errors in parentheses. BW = bandwidth, MSE = MSE-optimal, CER = CER-optimal. 
Standard errors in columns 2, 3, 4, and 6 are clustered at the IHE level. 
NN indicates heteroskedasticity-robust nearest neighbor variance estimator. 
NN cluster indicates cluster-robust nearest neighbor variance estimator clustered at the IHE level. 
Exp./Student indicates controls for 1-year lags of instructional and total expenditures per student. SAT indicates 
controls for the 1-year lag of the average of the 75th percentile of verbal and math SAT scores. 
 
We also manually set the bandwidth to 20, 30, and 40 rankings on either side of our threshold in 
Appendix Table A2. The bandwidth of 40 results in the largest possible bandwidth without crossing 
over another potentially important threshold (at a ranking of 10). Point estimates remain in the range 
of −4% to −6% across these bandwidths and estimates remain statistically significant. We also show 
results from local linear regressions using a uniform kernel in Appendix Table A3 and from local 
quadratic regressions in Appendix Table A4. Results are robust to these alternative specifications.19 
 
Table 7 shows RD results when we split the sample according to USNWR classification. We initially set 
the bandwidth at 40 for these subsamples to include a larger number of observations but also show 
results with a narrower bandwidth of 20. The outside-top-50 treatment effect is stronger for Liberal 
Arts Colleges than for National Universities. One explanation for this is that over one-half of the IHEs in 
the National Universities category are public whereas all but 36 observations from Liberal Arts Colleges 
are private IHEs. Students applying to public universities are typically more price sensitive (Leslie and 
Brinkman, 1987, Heller, 1997), and some proportion of them are paying discounted in-state tuition, so 
rankings may play a smaller role in the National University category. 
 
Table 7. Local Linear RD Results by Classification. 
 National Universities (1–4) Liberal Arts Colleges (5–8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Conventiona
l 
−0.0248** −0.0238** −0.0294 −0.0288 −0.0308** −0.0245 −0.0498** −0.0441** 
 (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0191) (0.0195) (0.0154) (0.0165) (0.0220) (0.0221) 
 National Universities (1–4) Liberal Arts Colleges (5–8) 



















−0.0319 −0.0293 −0.0348 −0.0344 −0.0533** −0.0481** −0.0858** −0.0743** 
 (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0359) (0.0364) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0351) (0.0376) 
BW 
Selection 
Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual 
Order Local 
Poly 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Order Bias 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
BW Local 
Poly 
40 40 20 20 40 40 20 20 


















Notes: Triangular kernel used in all columns. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. BW=bandwidth. 
Cluster-robust nearest neighbor variance estimator, clustered at the IHE level, is used for “Bias-Corrected 
Robust” standard errors in all columns. 
Exp./Student indicates controls for 1-year lags of instructional and total expenditures per student. 
SAT indicates controls for the 1-year lag of the average of the 75th percentile of verbal and math SAT scores. 
*** 
p < 0.01. 
** 
p < 0.05. 
* 
p < 0.1. 
 
We also note that we conducted the analogous analysis at the rankings threshold of 100. We find point 
estimates of −2% to −3% across all specifications for crossing the threshold of 100 but estimates on the 
pooled data are never statistically significant at conventional levels. The estimated effect is again 
stronger for Liberal Arts Colleges than for National Universities at the 100-threshold, where we find a 
bias-corrected point estimate for Liberal Arts Colleges in the range of −4% to −5%, statistically 
significant at the 10% level for some bandwidths. The bias-corrected point estimate for National 
Universities is in the range of −1% to −1.5% with standard errors that are twice as large. Thus, we 
conclude that there is only weak evidence of limited attention at the 100-threshold. 
 
3.3. Validity checks and falsification tests 
It is important to conduct various validity checks when using a RD design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
First, we verify that the included baseline covariates have equal conditional expectations at the RD 
cutoff. That is, we check for a discontinuity in the lag of logged applications at the ranking threshold of 
50. A discontinuity in this baseline covariate could cause our RD treatment effect estimator of interest 
to be inconsistent. As seen in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8, we do not find any statistically significant RD 
treatment effects for this baseline covariate.20 We also test for a discontinuous change in real tuition at 
the ranking threshold of 50 in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8. We do not find any evidence for a 
discontinuous change in real tuition, effectively ruling this out as an alternative explanation of our 
results. 
 
Table 8. Local Linear RD Validity Checks. 
Outcome Lag of Logged Applications Real Tuition Overall Composite Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional −0.0479 −0.0205 −0.0777 −0.572 −0.353 −0.143 
 (0.195) (0.208) (1.38) (1.44) (1.56) (1.65) 
Bias-Corrected −0.0315 −0.0111 −0.508 −0.795 −0.462 −0.218 
 (0.195) (0.208) (1.38) (1.44) (1.56) (1.65) 
Bias-Corrected Robust −0.0315 −0.0111 −0.508 −0.795 −0.462 −0.218 
 (0.230) (0.228) (1.60) (1.57) (1.79) (1.81) 
BW Selection MSE CER MSE CER MSE CER 
Order Local Poly 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Order Bias 2 2 2 2 2 2 
BW Local Poly 21.66 16.02 21.43 15.85 19.74 14.59 
BW Bias 30.67 30.67 30.46 30.46 27.87 27.87 
Effective Observations 839 616 849 579 769 552 
 
Notes: Triangular kernel used in all columns. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. BW = bandwidth, MSE = MSE-optimal, CER = CER-
optimal. 
Cluster-robust nearest neighbor variance estimator, clustered at the IHE level, is used for “Bias-Corrected 
Robust” standard errors in all columns. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
Another typical RD validity check is to look for possible manipulation in the assignment of the running 
variable to treatment status. This is typically done by testing for a discontinuity in the density of 
observations at the RD cutoff. In theory, it should not be possible to have such a discontinuity in our 
context because the running variable, USNWR ranking, is ordinal. Concentrating on the top 100 IHEs 
for example, there should be a uniform distribution of rankings. In practice, there are often ties in 
rankings so we observe specific values more frequently than others. We therefore conduct a formal 
test for a discontinuity in the density of observations at the cutoff of 50 and find no evidence of RD 
manipulation (robust p-value = 0.90).21 
 
Our explanation for the discontinuous drop in applications at the threshold of 50 is that students are 
displaying limited attention to the numerical ranking and placing undue importance on whether an IHE 
lands in the top-50. However, it could also be that there is truly a discontinuous drop in IHE quality at 
the threshold of 50. A feature of the USNWR rankings helps us test for a discontinuity in IHE quality. 
Along with the ordinal ranking, there is also a numerical “overall score” printed in the guide. 
Specifically, the overall score is a weighted composite of underlying quality indicators. The USNWR 
states that the indicators and weights for 2017 are as follows (with weights in parentheses): graduation 
and retention rates (22.5%), undergraduate academic reputation (22.5%), faculty resources (20%), 
student selectivity (12.5%), financial resources (10%), graduation rate performance (7.5%), and alumni 
giving rate (5%). Then, “the final scores were rescaled so that the top school in each category received 
a value of 100, and the other schools' weighted scores were calculated as a proportion of that top 
score.” USNWR rounds the composite score to the nearest whole number and then creates the ordinal 
rankings from the overall composite score. Therefore, while not a perfect measure of IHE quality, the 
overall composite score does carry some cardinal information. 
 
A sensible test for a discontinuous drop in IHE quality at the threshold of 50 is to use this overall 
composite score as a dependent variable and estimate the RD treatment effect at the ranking of 50. 
Fig. 5 shows a RD plot of ranking (with a bin width of 2) versus the average overall composite score. 
Visually, it appears that there is a continuous relationship between ranking and overall composite 
score in the neighborhood of the ranking threshold of 50. More formally, we utilize nonparametric 
local linear regression with overall composite score as the outcome variable; these results appear in 
columns 5 and 6 of Table 8. We find no statistical evidence of a discontinuity in IHE quality at the 
threshold of 50. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Overall Score vs. Rank. 
Notes: This figure shows average overall composite score by USNWR Ranking for all IHEs in the estimation 
sample. The vertical line indicates the RD cutoff. Global quartic functions are fit on both sides of the RD cutoff. 
The graph is produced using rdplot within the rdrobust package in Stata (Calonico et al., 2016c). 
 
We also investigate several falsification tests where we look for discontinuities in applications at 
rankings thresholds that should not matter. The MSE-optimal bandwidth from Table 6 is approximately 
15. Thus, we counterfactually move the threshold approximately 15 ranks in both directions and test 
for discontinuities at the ranks of 35 and 65. We manually set the bandwidth so as to not include 
observations at the threshold of 50. Table 9 reports results from these falsification tests; there is no 
evidence of discontinuities in logged applications at these thresholds. Likewise, we look for 
discontinuities at the rankings of 25 and 75 which allows us to set the bandwidth as large as possible 
without crossing over 50/51 or 100/101. Once again, we see no evidence of discontinuities in 
applications at any of these counterfactual thresholds. 
 
Table 9. Local Linear RD Falsification Tests. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Threshold 35 65 25 75 
Conventional 0.0122 −0.0180 −0.00549 0.00413 
 (0.0146) (0.0195) (0.0079) (0.0167) 
Bias-Corrected 0.00098 −0.0177 0.00426 0.0146 
 (0.0146) (0.0195) (0.0079) (0.0167) 
Robust 0.00098 −0.0177 0.00426 0.0146 
 (0.0214) (0.0287) (0.0114) (0.0251) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Threshold 35 65 25 75 
BW Selection Manual Manual Manual Manual 
Order Local Poly 1 1 1 1 
Order Bias 2 2 2 2 
BW Local Poly 15 14 25 24 
BW Bias 15 14 25 24 
Effective Observations 543 533 899 936 
 
Notes: Triangular kernel used in all columns. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. BW = bandwidth, MSE = MSE-optimal, CER = CER-
optimal. 
Cluster-robust nearest neighbor variance estimator, clustered at the IHE level, is used for “Bias-Corrected 
Robust” standard errors in all columns. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
Finally, one may question the relevance of a physical page break in a printed guide when the internet is 
increasingly the first place people look for information. Annual reports from the Cooperative 
Institutional Research Program provide suggestive evidence that magazine rankings have remained 
relevant over time. Released each year, these reports summarize surveys of several hundred-thousand 
first-time, full-time, first-year students at several hundred four-year colleges and universities across 
the United States.22 One survey question lists approximately 20 factors that could influence the choice 
of where to attend college. Among the potential reasons for the choice of a particular college are 
“Rankings in national magazines” and “Information from a website.” Respondents select “very 
important,” “somewhat important,” or “not important” for each potential reason. Fig. 6 shows the 
percentage of students who have selected “very important” for “Rankings in national magazines” and 
“Information from a website” over the sample period. The percentage of students saying, “Rankings in 
national magazines” were “very important” remained relatively constant over the sample period, with 
perhaps a slight increase over time. For comparison, the percentage of students saying “Information 
from a website” was “very important” increased more substantially over the time period and, 




Fig. 6. Cooperative Institutional Research Program Survey Responses over Time. 
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of first-time, full-time, first-year students indicating “Rankings in 
national magazines” and “Information from a website” were “very important” in their choice of a particular 
college. Data for this figure come from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program’s 2004–2013 annual 
publications on the survey titled “The American Freshman: National Norms.” 
 
Other evidence on the changing importance of the print rankings comes from Google Trends. Fig. 7 
displays Google search trends for “us news college rankings” and “college application”.23 Both series 
are trending up over time and highly seasonal with spikes corresponding to the traditional fall 
application season. It does appear that, beginning around 2009, the popularity of “us news college 
rankings” somewhat increases relative to “college application.” This suggests that online rankings could 
have started playing a slightly more prominent role at that time. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Google Search Trends for USNWR Rankings over Time. 
Notes: This figure shows Google search popularity for the terms “us news college rankings” and “college 
application.” A value of 100 represents peak popularity. Data for this figure come from Google Trends 
(https://trends.google.com/trends/). 
 
Taken together, the Cooperative Institutional Research Program survey reports and Google trends 
suggest that we should see a decrease in the importance of the physical page break in the printed 
guides in the later years of our sample relative to the earlier years. In terms of our analysis, this 
suggests that the magnitude of the estimated discontinuity in applications at the ranking threshold of 
50 should decrease in later years. Table 10 shows RD results when we split our sample into the years of 
2004–2008 and 2009–2013. Point estimates of the discontinuity are nearly twice as large for the first 
five years as compared to the second five years. Furthermore, results are no longer statistically 
significant at conventional levels when focusing on the period of 2009–2013. This supports our 
argument that limited attention to the rankings due to a physical break in the printed guide is driving 
the estimated discontinuity in applications at the ranking threshold of 50. 
 
Table 10. Local Linear RD Results by Time Period. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years 2004–2008 2004–2008 2009–2013 2009–2013 
Conventional −0.0618* −0.0776* −0.0395 −0.0461 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years 2004–2008 2004–2008 2009–2013 2009–2013 
 (0.0320) (0.0430) (0.0260) (0.0315) 
Bias-Corrected −0.0704** -0.0828* −0.0413 −0.0459 
 (0.0320) (0.0430) (0.0260) (0.0315) 
Robust -0.0704* -0.0828* −0.0413 −0.0459 
 (0.0387) (0.0469) (0.0314) (0.0344) 
BW Selection MSE CER MSE CER 
Order Local Poly 1 1 1 1 
Order Bias 2 2 2 2 
BW Local Poly 17.55 13.27 13.53 10.01 
BW Bias 30.19 30.19 22.31 22.31 
Effective Observations 336 252 251 195 
 
Notes: Triangular kernel used in all columns. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. BW = bandwidth, MSE = MSE-optimal, CER = CER-
optimal. 
Cluster-robust nearest neighbor variance estimator, clustered at the IHE level, is used for “Bias-Corrected 
Robust” standard errors in all columns. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the growing body of evidence that economic agents use heuristics to process 
complex information. We find a discontinuous drop in applications of approximately 5% when the 
USNWR rank falls from inside the top 50 to outside the top 50, suggesting that some students are 
displaying limited attention to rankings. This has implications for long-term student outcomes, as 
students may be applying to schools that are a worse quality match than they would in absence of 
limited attention. 
 
To help understand the welfare implications of limited attention in the application decision, consider a 
student who has decided on some fixed number of applications to send and is considering where to 
send their last application. Because of limited attention, this student is substantially more likely to 
apply to an IHE ranked in the range of 41–50 relative to an IHE ranked in the range of 51–60. However, 
as we have shown, there are no discontinuous differences in quality between these two sets of IHEs. 
Moreover, the likelihood of a successful application declines as USNWR improves, making it less likely 
the student is admitted to an institution of similar quality.24 The decline in the likelihood of admission 
is exacerbated by the added competition from other students who are applying to the IHEs ranked 41–
50 as the limited attention problem we demonstrate is a market-wide phenomenon. The decline in 
admissions probability for the student at an IHE ranked 41–50, and the missing application that would 
have occurred at a school in the 51–60 range, make it more likely the marginal student ends up with a 
worse quality match, perhaps at an IHE outside of the top 60. 
 
To demonstrate the scale of students who may end up worse off due to their limited attention, 
consider that National Universities ranked 41–50 receive 27,023 applications on average and Liberal 
Arts Colleges ranked 41–50 receive 4322 applications on average. RD estimates from Table 7 suggest 
that limited attention is responsible for an approximate 3% drop in applications for National 
Universities that rank at 51 or higher, or about 800 applications per affected IHE. Likewise, results in 
Table 7 indicate that limited attention accounts for an approximate 5% decline in applications for 
Liberal Arts Colleges that rank at 51 or higher, or around 350 missing applications per affected IHE. At 
the average admit rates of National Universities ranked 51–60, about 416 of the 800 missing 
applications would have been admitted. Similarly, around 196 of the missing 350 applications to Liberal 
Arts Colleges would have been admitted. Using an average yield rate for National Universities ranked 
51–60 of 34% and an average yield rate for Liberal Arts Colleges ranked 51–60 of 30%, we can surmise 
that around 140 (58) more students would have chosen to attend each of the National Universities 
(Liberal Arts Colleges) ranked 51–60 in the absence of limited attention. The open question is where 
exactly these students finally enroll. Some likely end up in better ranked schools, such as those ranked 
41–50, because students are overreacting to a top 50 ranking. Surely others end up in schools ranked 
worse than 60 because of their failure to apply to IHEs ranked just worse than 50. Our back of the 
envelope calculations suggest that, over our 10 year study period, potentially thousands of students 
have found themselves worse off because of limited attention to rankings. 
 
Furthermore, we can provide an approximate idea of the importance of limited attention relative to 
other IHE attributes. National Universities ranked 51–60 receive 22,066 applications on average which 
is 4957 fewer applications than those ranked 41–50. Therefore, we can attribute roughly 16% of the 
difference in applications between these two groups to limited attention and the remaining 84% of the 
application differences to other IHE attributes such as differential quality or size. Analogously, for 
Liberal Arts Colleges, IHEs ranked between 51 and 60 receive 3115 applications, which is 1207 fewer 
applications on average than IHEs between 41 and 50 receive. Hence, nearly 30% of the decline in 
applications between these two groups of Liberal Arts Colleges is due to limited attention. 
 
We have explained throughout that it is prospective students who are exhibiting limited attention; 
however, an alternative explanation is that another agent in the education or labor market displays 
limited attention and prospective students are behaving accordingly in response. For example, 
employers could proxy applicants’ quality with the rank of their undergraduate institutions. It could be 
that employers use a decision heuristic such as “top-50” in deciding who to interview or hire. If 
students perfectly internalized this information, we could observe the same discontinuity in their 
application decisions at the ranking threshold of 50. We believe that this is an unlikely primary driver of 
the results for several reasons. First, this would require that prospective college students perfectly 
internalize this information, which seems unlikely given the other behavioral biases that have been 
documented in the behavioral economics of education literature. Secondly, we would expect to find 
more robust evidence of discontinuities at the rankings thresholds of 10 or 100 if it were another agent 
such as employers driving the result. That we find the most robust evidence of a discontinuity at 50 
suggests that it is the physical page break in the printed guide that is most important. Moreover, the 
estimated discontinuity at the threshold of 50 decreases over time while evidence suggests that 
printed guides concurrently became relatively less important over time. Nevertheless, we cannot 
completely rule out the possibility that other agents exhibit similar limited attention to rankings. This 
could indeed be one reason why we find some suggestive evidence of a discontinuous drop in 
applications at the threshold of 100. 
 
RD offers an average treatment effect around the threshold of 50 for USNWR rankings, calling into 
question external validity of the findings outside of a narrow range around the threshold. While the 
results cannot be used to say that the same magnitude of effect happens in other settings, we submit 
that the 50 threshold is just one of multiple thresholds that could affect application decisions. The 
threshold at 50 may be particularly salient because of the printed USNWR page cutoff, but it is likely 
some students utilize other rankings thresholds to guide their decisions. Therefore, our findings of 
limited attention may have implications for student matching throughout the rankings continuum. 
 
Appendix A 
Table A1. Regression Results: Effects of Rankings Thresholds on Applications. 
 Varying Polynomial Order 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Threshold 
>10 −0.0176* 0.000954 0.0147 0.00889 0.00710 
 (0.00939) (0.0109) (0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0134) 
>50 −0.0219** −0.0207** −0.0283** −0.0277** −0.0320** 
 (0.0102) (0.00999) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0134) 
>100 −0.00855 −0.0225* −0.0165 −0.0144 −0.0102 
 (0.01000) (0.0125) (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.0170) 
Polynomial Order 2 3 5 6 7 
Observations 2613 2613 2613 2613 2613 
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Regression specifications for all columns include the 1-year lag of logged applications, indicators for Carnegie 
classification, IHE sector, and year. 
 
Table A2. Local Linear RD Results at Ranking Threshold of 50 with Manual Bandwidths. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conventional −0.0404** −0.0368** −0.0323** −0.0290** −0.0267** −0.0230** 
 (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0108) (0.0113) 
Bias-Corrected −0.0605*** −0.0529*** −0.0488*** −0.0453*** −0.0439*** −0.0401*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0108) (0.0113) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bias-Corrected Robust −0.0605** −0.0529* −0.0488** −0.0453** −0.0439*** −0.0401** 
 (0.0277) (0.0288) (0.0208) (0.0212) (0.0171) (0.0173) 
BW Selection Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual 
Order Local Poly 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Order Bias 2 2 2 2 2 2 
BW Local Poly 20 20 30 30 40 40 
BW Bias 20 20 30 30 40 40 










Notes: Triangular kernel used in all columns. 
Standard errors in parentheses. BW = bandwidth. 
Cluster-robust nearest neighbor variance estimator, clustered at the IHE level, is used for “Robust” standard 
errors in all columns. 
*** 
p < 0.01. 
** 
p < 0.05. 
* 
p < 0.1 
 
Table A3. Local Linear RD Results at Ranking Threshold of 50 with Uniform Kernel. 
 (1) (2) (2) (4) (6) 
Conventional −0.0398** −0.0657** −0.0379*** −0.0304*** −0.0178* 
 (0.0194) (0.0320) (0.0141) (0.0113) (0.0095) 
Bias-Corrected −0.0446*** −0.0680** −0.0405*** −0.0361*** −0.0391*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0320) (0.0141) (0.0113) (0.0095) 
Bias-Corrected Robust −0.0446** −0.0680** −0.0405* −0.0361** −0.0391*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0335) (0.0245) (0.0183) (0.0151) 
BW Selection MSE CER Manual Manual Manual 
Order Local Poly 1 1 1 1 1 
Order Bias 2 2 2 2 2 
BW Local Poly 12.66 8.88 20 30 40 
BW Bias 23.25 24.45 20 30 40 
Effective Observations 465 303 813 1165 1543 
 
Notes: Uniform kernel used in all columns. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. BW = bandwidth, MSE = MSE-optimal, CER = CER-
optimal. 
Cluster-robust nearest neighbor variance estimator, clustered at the IHE level, is used for “Bias-Corrected 
Robust” standard errors in all columns. 
*** 
p < 0.01. 
** 
p < 0.05. 
* 
p < 0.1. 
 
Table A4. Local Quadratic RD Results at Ranking Threshold of 50. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4ap) 
Conventional −0.0699** −0.0412* −0.0442*** −0.0391*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0244) (0.0171) (0.0151) 
Bias-Corrected −0.0783*** −0.0485** −0.0529*** −0.0500*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0244) (0.0171) (0.0151) 
Bias-Corrected Robust −0.0783** −0.0485* −0.0529** −0.0500** 
 (0.0353) (0.0282) (0.0249) (0.0222) 
Kernel Triangular Uniform Triangular Uniform 
BW Selection MSE MSE Manual Manual 
Order Local Poly 2 2 2 2 
Order Bias 3 3 3 3 
BW Local Poly 17.24 20.41 40 40 
BW Bias 24.60 30.44 40 40 
Effective Observations 664 813 1504 1543 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the IHE level. BW = bandwidth, MSE = MSE-optimal, 
Cluster-robust nearest neighbor variance estimator, clustered at the IHE level, is used for “Bias-Corrected 
Robust” standard errors in all columns. 
*** 
p < 0.01. 
** 
p < 0.05. 
* 
p < 0.1. 
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1The application process for undergraduate education in the U.S. is decentralized. Potential students 
complete applications (typically including an application fee) for each institution they are interested in 
attending. For most institutions, the decision is then made as to whether or not the student will be 
admitted into the institution overall, as opposed to being admitted into a specific program. 
 
2A long literature examines the effect of college attendance on several outcomes including career 
opportunities (Ferber and Green, 2003), geographic mobility (Costa and Kahn, 2000, Carree and 
Kronenberg, 2014), earnings (Andrews et al., 2016, Dale and Krueger, 2014, Hoekstra, 2009), spousal 
matching (Schwartz and Mare, 2005), and overall happiness (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). 
 
3Monks and Ehrenberg (1999) document an association between IHE rankings and applications. 
Meredith (2004) leverages panel data from 1991 to 2000 and estimates an IHE fixed-effects model to 
find that several admissions outcomes change when IHEs move within the top 25 or between the first 
two quartiles of rankings. Griffith and Rask (2007) also find some evidence that students are more 
likely to attend IHEs with better rankings. 
 
4Koch et al. (2015) and Lavecchia et al. (2016) review the behavioral economics of education literature. 
 
5Gnolek et al. (2014) provide an extensive discussion of the literature on the USNWR rankings. 
 
6For examples, see Bettinger et al. (2012), Pallais (2015), Papay et al. (2016), and Smith et al. (2014). 
 
7We find some anecdotal evidence to support this claim via a Google search. For each IHE ranked in the 
2016 guide, we searched for “(IHE name) usnews ranking” and then examined the first page of search 
results. We then followed any links to the given IHE’s website. We found one National University and 
one Liberal Arts College that categorically identify their ranking as “top 10” rather than that focusing 
on the specific ranking. Similarly, we found 4 National Universities and 4 Liberal Arts Colleges that 
emphasize the categorical ranking of “top 100” over the specific numerical ranking. Moreover, until 
recently, the “list view” on the USNWR website displayed the top 10 ranked IHE’s on the first page. We 
also found two IHEs that list “top 25” on their website. Moreover, some non-USNWR rankings only 
include the “top 25” so we also investigated a potential threshold at 25. See Section 3.1 for further 
details. 
 
8For more specific information on how the rankings are constructed please see 
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/rankings-methodologies. 
 
9Our sample covers the period from 2004 to 2013. We collect information on applications for fall 2003 
to include information on lagged applications in our subsequent analysis. 
 
10The Carnegie classification is a commonly recognized system used to categorize U.S. IHEs based on 
the types of degrees awarded and level of research activity. For more information please see 
http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/ 
 
11SAT scores are missing for approximately 10% of our observations in the IPEDs database so including 
this variable does somewhat change the composition of our sample. 
 
12We estimate this model with IHE fixed effects as a robustness check but it is not our preferred 
specification because there is little within-IHE variation in treatment status. For example, on average, 
there are just over 2 IHEs that move into (and out of) the top-50 in each year. The RD literature has 
shown that the variance of the estimator can increase when this is the case (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
 
13We also estimated specifications identical to those reported in Table 3 but adding an indicator for 
crossing the threshold of 25. We do not find any evidence of a discontinuity at the 25-threshold. 
Coefficient estimates on the indicator for crossing the 25-threshold are close to 0 and not statistically 
significant. Adding the 25-threshold only slightly changes the point estimates of the discontinuity at the 
50-threshold, but not the statistical significance. These results are available upon request. 
 
14We allow the regression function to take on different slopes on both sides of the threshold. For 
example, the conventional RD estimator with linear controls and a uniform kernel is given by the 
specification,  
 
15RD estimation has been mostly viewed as a nonparametric estimation problem since Hahn et al. 
(2001) because the functional form is unknown and misspecification of the functional form in RD can 
lead to a large bias in the RD estimate of the treatment effect (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
 
16A mean squared error (MSE) expansion of the local linear RD estimator includes both the variance of 
the estimator and the bias of the estimator. 
 
17We use the rdrobust package within Stata for all RD estimation (Calonico et al., 2016b). Papay et al. 
(2016) also utilize local linear regression. Hahn et al. (2001) originally suggest using local linear 
regressions to reduce bias (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
 
18After showing that both variance estimators produce similar results in Table 6, we adopt the cluster 
robust nearest neighbor variance estimator (clustering at the level of the IHE) for the remainder of the 
paper. Results using other variance estimators are similar and available upon request. 
 
19Two specifications in Table A3, Table A4 produce point estimates that are somewhat larger in 
absolute value but they also have larger standard errors. 
 
20As noted by Lee and Lemieux (2010), where Y denotes the outcome variable, “finding a discontinuity 
in Yit but not in Yit-1 would be a strong piece of evidence supporting the validity of the RD design.” 
 
21We specifically use the test proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2016a), which improves upon the widely 
utilized McCrary (2008) test. We use the default options of the Cattaneo et al. (2016a) test as 
implemented in the rddensity package (Cattaneo et al., 2016b). 
 
22The results are weighted to be approximately representative of the national population of first-time, 
full-time, first-year students. 
 
23According to Google Trends, “us news college rankings” and “college application” are the most 
popular search queries related to the corresponding topics. The Google Trends data are normalized so 
that “a value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as 
popular.” We limit the geographic area to the United States. 
 
24We conduct a parallel RD analysis using the admit rate as the dependent variable in place of 
applications and find a discontinuity in the admit rate at the threshold of 50. For the MSE-optimal 
bandwidth, we find that the admit rate increases by 2 percentage points when moving from inside the 
top 50 to outside the top 50 (significant at the 5% level). Included baseline covariates include the lag of 
admit rate, year fixed effects, a dummy for private versus public IHE, and a dummy for a Carnegie 
classification of a bachelors institution. Full results on admit rate are available upon request. 
 
 
 
